



## **THE MUN FACTORY**

*School of Global Excellence — TMF 3.0*

**FOUNDATIONAL WHITE PAPER**

# **UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY RESPONSE COUNCIL (UNERC)**

*Designing the Future of Global Emergency Governance*

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### **AGENDA**

*Evaluating the effectiveness of the United Nations' response to complex global emergencies through the assessment of institutional challenges, inter-agency coordination, and the deliberation on establishing a permanent United Nations Emergency Response Council (UNERC).*

A Design-Oriented Institutional Simulation

## SECTION 1 | **About The MUN Factory**

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The MUN Factory (TMF) is an India-based Model United Nations organisation built on the premise that simulated diplomacy should be held to the same intellectual standard as the institutions it represents. Since its founding, TMF has positioned itself as a platform where delegates engage with primary sources, institutional mandates, and unresolved policy questions rather than pre-packaged conclusions.

TMF 3.0 reflects the organisation's third structural iteration, oriented around research rigour, procedural literacy, and the production of background material comparable to that of professional policy institutions. This white paper is a product of that orientation.

## SECTION 2 | Introduction to UNERC

The United Nations Emergency Response Council (UNERC) is a hypothetical committee constructed for the purpose of this conference. It does not exist within the current UN institutional architecture. Its function is deliberative and constructive: delegates are asked to examine, using historical evidence and institutional analysis, whether the existing distribution of emergency-response authority across the Security Council, ECOSOC, and the operational agencies is adequate to modern crises — and if not, what a new coordinating body might look like.

### Nature of Debate

UNERC is a specialised, design-oriented committee. Unlike crisis committees that simulate a single unfolding event, UNERC's task spans the structural level — delegates draft the constitutive framework of an institution rather than respond to a single incident.

### Purpose and Scope

The committee's output is expected to be a working charter or resolution outlining UNERC's proposed mandate, structure, and relationship to existing organs — or a reasoned resolution against its creation, grounded in institutional-design tradeoffs.

### Importance

The debate is not academic. The frequency and overlap of emergencies since 2020 — a pandemic, cascading climate disasters, two major regional wars, and repeated large-scale displacement — have repeatedly tested the UN's coordination capacity. Whether that capacity is a matter of adequate existing tools poorly used, or a genuine institutional gap, is the question this committee exists to resolve.

#### Framing Note for Delegates

*This is not a crisis committee. Your task is institutional architecture: define a mandate, a structure, a funding model, and a relationship to existing organs — or argue convincingly why none of that should be built.*

## SECTION 3 | Understanding Modern Global Emergencies

### ***Armed Conflicts***

Interstate and intrastate conflict remains the most persistent driver of humanitarian need, generating displacement, infrastructure collapse, and blocked humanitarian access simultaneously. Modern conflicts increasingly implicate multiple UN mandates at once — peacekeeping, human rights monitoring, food security, and refugee protection — within a single theatre.

### ***Climate Disasters***

Rising frequency of extreme weather events (floods, cyclones, heatwaves) compounds pre-existing vulnerability. Climate emergencies differ from conflict in that they are often anticipatable through early-warning systems, yet response remains reactive due to funding structures tied to declared emergencies rather than pre-positioned capacity.

### ***Pandemics***

COVID-19 demonstrated that health emergencies are simultaneously economic, logistical, and geopolitical emergencies, requiring coordination between WHO, WTO (on trade in medical goods), UNDP (on socioeconomic recovery), and national customs authorities.

### ***Food Insecurity***

Increasingly a downstream consequence of conflict, climate shocks, and supply-chain disruption (e.g., Black Sea grain exports) rather than a standalone phenomenon, implicating FAO, WFP, and the Security Council where blockades are involved.

### ***Cyber Warfare***

Attacks on hospital networks, power grids, and financial systems now constitute humanitarian threats without a clear lead UN agency, exposing a structural gap in the emergency architecture.

### ***Nuclear Accidents***

Governed by IAEA conventions (Early Notification, Assistance Conventions) but response coordination with humanitarian agencies remains largely ad hoc, as seen in the monitoring of Zaporizhzhia during the Ukraine conflict.

### ***Artificial Intelligence Risks***

An emerging category without settled institutional ownership — spanning disinformation during crises, autonomous weapons, and critical-infrastructure dependency, raising the question of whether emergency governance frameworks are equipped for non-physical, diffuse-origin risks.

### ***Mass Migration***

Displacement driven by the compounding of the categories above, requiring UNHCR, IOM, and host-state cooperation under a legal framework (1951 Refugee Convention) that predates most contemporary drivers of movement.

### ***Financial Crises***

Sovereign debt distress and currency crises interact directly with a state's capacity to respond to concurrent emergencies, implicating the World Bank and IMF alongside humanitarian actors.

### **Why Cross-Agency Coordination Is Required**

Each category above is rarely isolated in practice — the Ukraine crisis alone touches conflict, nuclear safety, food security, and mass displacement concurrently. No single UN agency holds a mandate spanning more than one category, meaning modern emergencies default to multi-agency response by necessity rather than design. The absence of a standing coordinating authority above the operational-agency level is the central institutional question this paper examines.

## SECTION 4 | Evolution of the United Nations Emergency Architecture

The table below traces the institutional build-out of the UN's emergency and humanitarian architecture from 1945 to the present — the foundation against which UNERC's proposed addition should be evaluated.

| Year      | Development                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1945      | UN Charter signed; Article 1 establishes maintenance of peace and international cooperation as founding purposes; Chapter VII grants the Security Council enforcement authority.        |
| 1946      | UNICEF established (as UN International Children's Emergency Fund) to address child welfare in post-war Europe.                                                                         |
| 1948      | WHO founded as the UN's specialised health agency.                                                                                                                                      |
| 1950      | UNHCR established for the protection of refugees, initially for post-WWII European displacement.                                                                                        |
| 1961      | UNDP founded, consolidating UN technical-assistance and pre-investment funding programmes.                                                                                              |
| 1965      | UNICEF's mandate expanded permanently to all children in developing countries.                                                                                                          |
| 1971      | UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) created — the first dedicated UN disaster-response coordination body.                                                                                 |
| 1991      | General Assembly Resolution 46/182 creates the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (later OCHA) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), formalising humanitarian coordination.   |
| 1998      | DHA reorganised into OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).                                                                                                        |
| 2005      | Humanitarian Reform Agenda introduces the "Cluster System," assigning lead agencies to specific humanitarian sectors (e.g., WFP for logistics, UNHCR for shelter in conflict settings). |
| 2016      | World Humanitarian Summit convened; "Grand Bargain" agreement on humanitarian financing efficiency.                                                                                     |
| 2020–2023 | COVID-19 response tests cross-agency coordination at unprecedented scale; ACT-Accelerator and COVAX established outside the traditional humanitarian architecture.                      |

## SECTION 5 | Existing UN Institutions and Their Roles

### ***UN Security Council***

Mandate: maintenance of international peace and security (Ch. V–VII).

Legal Authority: binding resolutions; sole UN body able to authorise use of force and sanctions.

Emergency Responsibilities: authorises peacekeeping mandates, imposes sanctions regimes, refers situations to the ICC.

Past Contributions: MINUSMA, UNIFIL, sanctions on conflict financing.

Limitations: P5 veto (Art. 27(3)) has repeatedly blocked action, most visibly on Syria and Ukraine.

Inter-Agency Relationships: mandates peacekeeping operations that OCHA, UNHCR, and WFP subsequently operate alongside.

### ***UN General Assembly***

Mandate: universal deliberative forum (Art. 10–17).

Legal Authority: recommendatory, non-binding, except on budgetary and internal matters.

Emergency Responsibilities: “Uniting for Peace” mechanism when Security Council is deadlocked; convenes special sessions (e.g., on Ukraine, 2022).

Past Contributions: special emergency sessions on major crises.

Limitations: no enforcement power.

Inter-Agency Relationships: oversees ECOSOC and elects non-permanent Security Council members.

### ***ECOSOC***

Mandate: coordination of economic, social, and related UN work (Ch. X).

Legal Authority: coordinates but does not command specialised agencies.

Emergency Responsibilities: convenes Humanitarian Affairs Segment annually.

Past Contributions: annual coordination segment linking agency reporting.

Limitations: coordination without enforcement capacity; agencies retain operational independence.

Inter-Agency Relationships: sits above OCHA and the specialised agencies in the formal hierarchy without commanding them.

### ***WHO***

Mandate: the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.

Legal Authority: International Health Regulations (2005) are binding on member states, including the power to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).

Emergency Responsibilities: global health emergency coordination and vaccine-access frameworks.

Past Contributions: smallpox eradication, COVID-19 vaccine coordination via COVAX.

Limitations: depends on state self-reporting; lacks enforcement mechanism for IHR compliance, as seen in early COVID-19 reporting delays.

Inter-Agency Relationships: coordinates with UNICEF on logistics and WTO on trade-related health measures.

### **UNICEF**

Mandate: child survival, protection, and development.

Legal Authority: operates under General Assembly mandate, not a binding treaty regime.

Emergency Responsibilities: lead of the Child Protection and Nutrition clusters.

Past Contributions: vaccination campaigns in conflict zones, education-in-emergencies programming.

Limitations: access constrained by parties to conflict; funding heavily earmarked, limiting flexibility.

Inter-Agency Relationships: co-leads clusters with WHO, UNHCR, and WFP depending on setting.

### **UNDP**

Mandate: poverty eradication and sustainable development.

Legal Authority: operates under General Assembly and ECOSOC oversight.

Emergency Responsibilities: early recovery and governance restoration post-crisis (e.g., post-earthquake reconstruction planning in Türkiye).

Past Contributions: long-term recovery programming following major disasters.

Limitations: development mandate creates tension with immediate humanitarian priorities during acute emergencies.

Inter-Agency Relationships: hands off from OCHA-led acute response into UNDP-led recovery phases.

### **UNHCR**

Mandate: international protection of refugees under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.

Legal Authority: treaty-based protection mandate; supervisory role under the Refugee Convention.

Emergency Responsibilities: shelter cluster lead in conflict settings; registration and protection of displaced populations.

Past Contributions: Syrian, Rohingya, and Ukrainian refugee responses.

Limitations: mandate covers cross-border refugees more robustly than internally displaced persons (IDPs); dependent on host-state cooperation.

Inter-Agency Relationships: coordinates with IOM on migration and WFP/UNICEF on camp-level services.

### **UNEP**

Mandate: environmental policy coordination.

Legal Authority: advisory and normative, not enforcement-based.

Emergency Responsibilities: post-disaster environmental assessment (e.g., chemical contamination, industrial accident response).

Past Contributions: environmental impact assessments following industrial and conflict-related disasters.

Limitations: no operational disaster-response capacity of its own; advisory in nature.

Inter-Agency Relationships: feeds assessments into OCHA-coordinated response planning.

### **FAO**

Mandate: food security and agriculture.

Legal Authority: technical and normative mandate under its founding constitution.

Emergency Responsibilities: co-leads Food Security Cluster with WFP; monitors famine indicators (IPC classification).

Past Contributions: famine early-warning classification (IPC) used globally as a reference standard.

Limitations: distinct from WFP's direct food distribution — coordination overlap between the two has historically caused friction.

Inter-Agency Relationships: co-leads the Food Security Cluster jointly with WFP.

## **WTO**

Mandate: governance of international trade rules.

Legal Authority: binding trade agreements among members; dispute-settlement authority.

Emergency Responsibilities: waiver mechanisms for trade barriers during crises (e.g., TRIPS waiver debate for COVID-19 vaccines).

Past Contributions: temporary tariff and export-restriction waivers during past crises.

Limitations: consensus-based decision-making makes rapid emergency waivers difficult, as the prolonged TRIPS waiver negotiation demonstrated.

Inter-Agency Relationships: coordinates with WHO on trade in medical goods during health emergencies.

## **SPECPOL (Fourth Committee)**

Mandate: decolonization, peacekeeping oversight, atomic radiation effects, outer space.

Legal Authority: recommendatory, General Assembly committee.

Emergency Responsibilities: reviews peacekeeping mandates alongside the Security Council; addresses radiological emergency policy.

Past Contributions: periodic review reports feeding into Security Council mandate renewals.

Limitations: overlaps with Security Council authority on peacekeeping without binding power of its own.

Inter-Agency Relationships: works alongside the Security Council and IAEA on radiological and peacekeeping matters.

## SECTION 6 | Case Studies

### ***COVID-19 Pandemic (2020–2023)***

Timeline: PHEIC declared January 2020; pandemic declared March 2020; COVAX launched April 2020; global vaccination inequity persisted through 2021–22.

Agencies Involved: WHO, UNICEF (vaccine logistics), WTO (TRIPS waiver debate), UNDP (socioeconomic recovery).

Successes: rapid vaccine development coordination; global genomic-surveillance sharing.

Failures: vaccine nationalism left low-income countries reliant on delayed COVAX deliveries; WHO lacked enforcement power over early reporting and travel-measure compliance.

Political Obstacles: major-power tension over origin investigations; TRIPS waiver blocked for over a year.

Lessons: health emergencies require pre-negotiated manufacturing and distribution agreements before crises occur, not during them.

### ***Ukraine Humanitarian Crisis (2022–present)***

Timeline: full-scale invasion February 2022; Black Sea Grain Initiative July 2022–July 2023; ongoing IDP and refugee response.

Agencies Involved: UNHCR, OCHA, WFP, IAEA (Zaporizhzhia monitoring).

Successes: largest European refugee response since WWII processed with comparatively low registration friction; Grain Initiative temporarily stabilised global food prices.

Failures: Security Council paralysed by a permanent member's veto as a direct party to the conflict; Grain Initiative collapsed in 2023.

Political Obstacles: veto-holder conflict of interest exposes a structural flaw in Chapter VII enforcement.

Lessons: crises involving a P5 state require alternative coordination channels outside the Security Council.

### ***Türkiye–Syria Earthquake (February 2023)***

Timeline: magnitude 7.8 and 7.5 quakes, 6 February 2023; cross-border aid corridor negotiations followed within days.

Agencies Involved: OCHA, WHO, UNDP, UNHCR (for the Syrian side).

Successes: rapid Türkiye-side response aided by strong national disaster infrastructure (AFAD).

Failures: aid access into northwest Syria was delayed by negotiation over border-crossing authorisation, compounded by the region's existing conflict-driven fragmentation.

Political Obstacles: cross-border access required political authorisation in an active conflict setting.

Lessons: humanitarian access in active conflict zones cannot rely solely on ad hoc crossing agreements.

### ***Pakistan Floods (2022)***

Timeline: monsoon flooding from June–October 2022 affected roughly a third of the country.

Agencies Involved: OCHA, WFP, FAO, UNICEF.

Successes: rapid needs-assessment deployment; the crisis became a reference point in loss-and-damage climate-finance negotiations at COP27.

Failures: funding appeals were significantly underfunded relative to assessed need.

Political Obstacles: climate-finance responsibility debates slowed international commitment.

Lessons: climate-attributed disasters expose the gap between humanitarian appeal financing and the scale of climate-driven need.

### ***Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004)***

Timeline: 26 December 2004, affecting fourteen countries.

Agencies Involved: UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO.

Successes: catalysed the creation of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System; one of the largest voluntary humanitarian funding responses on record.

Failures: absence of early-warning infrastructure at the time of the event contributed significantly to the death toll.

Political Obstacles: coordination among fourteen affected states with varying capacity.

Lessons: prevention infrastructure is more cost-effective than post-disaster response, informing later investment in early-warning systems globally.

### ***Ebola Crisis (2014–2016, West Africa)***

Timeline: outbreak identified Guinea, December 2013; PHEIC declared August 2014; outbreak declared over 2016.

Agencies Involved: WHO, UNICEF, UNDP.

Successes: the crisis directly prompted the post-2016 WHO Health Emergencies Programme reform.

Failures: WHO was criticised for a delayed PHEIC declaration despite early warnings from Médecins Sans Frontières.

Political Obstacles: slow institutional escalation despite field-level warnings.

Lessons: early-warning signal escalation pathways must bypass bureaucratic delay in fast-moving outbreaks.

### ***Gaza Humanitarian Crisis (2023–present)***

Timeline: escalation from October 2023; recurring access and ceasefire negotiations since.

Agencies Involved: UNRWA, OCHA, WHO, WFP.

Successes: sustained large-scale aid mobilisation despite access constraints.

Failures: severe access restrictions and infrastructure destruction have repeatedly constrained aid delivery; funding disruptions to UNRWA followed allegations affecting a subset of staff.

Political Obstacles: Security Council resolutions on ceasefire terms have faced repeated veto or near-veto dynamics.

Lessons: humanitarian access negotiation in active conflict remains dependent on the consent of parties to the conflict, with no binding UN mechanism to compel access.

## SECTION 7 | Institutional Challenges

- Funding limitations — humanitarian appeals are consistently underfunded relative to assessed need; funding is voluntary and earmarked rather than pooled.
- Fragmented mandates — overlapping cluster leads (e.g., FAO/WFP on food security) create coordination friction.
- Political deadlock — Security Council action is contingent on P5 consensus.
- Security Council veto — structurally disables action when a permanent member is a party to the crisis.
- Delayed response — early-warning signals often exist before formal declarations (PHEIC, famine classification) are issued.
- Information sharing — state self-reporting obligations (e.g., IHR) lack enforcement mechanisms.
- Logistics and supply chains — last-mile delivery in active conflict zones remains the most persistent operational bottleneck.
- Technology gaps — agencies vary widely in digital coordination infrastructure, complicating real-time cross-agency data sharing.
- National sovereignty — humanitarian access requires host-state or conflict-party consent, which is not compellable.
- Media misinformation — crisis-period disinformation complicates both public fundraising and operational safety.
- Public trust — allegations affecting individual agency staff (e.g., UNRWA) have had disproportionate effects on donor confidence in entire response systems.

### Diagram Note

*A flowchart of a typical emergency escalation pathway — from early-warning signal to Security Council / ECOSOC / agency-level response — annotated with points of typical delay, should accompany this section in committee research.*

## SECTION 8 | The Need for a United Nations Emergency Response Council

### Arguments in Favour

- Consolidates cross-agency coordination under one accountable body.
- Could act where Security Council vetoes stall action.
- Provides a standing rapid-finance mechanism rather than appeal-based funding.
- Centralises early-warning escalation across conflict, climate, health, and cyber domains.

### Arguments Opposed

- Risks duplicating ECOSOC/OCHA's existing coordination role.
- Creates a new bureaucratic layer without new enforcement authority unless granted Chapter VII-equivalent powers, which member states may resist.
- Funding a new standing body competes with existing agency budgets.
- Sovereignty concerns over a body with cross-sectoral emergency powers.

| Consideration | Case For UNERC                             | Case Against UNERC                                               |
|---------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Coordination  | Single point of accountability             | OCHA/IASC already perform this function                          |
| Speed         | Standing capacity reduces activation delay | New body requires its own ramp-up time                           |
| Financing     | Pooled standing fund possible              | Competes with existing agency budgets                            |
| Authority     | Could bypass Security Council deadlock     | Unlikely to receive binding enforcement power from member states |
| Legitimacy    | Broader membership than Security Council   | Risk of becoming another underfunded, advisory-only body         |

## SECTION 9 | Possible Governance Models

### **Permanent Council**

Standing membership, continuous mandate. Strongest institutional memory and readiness; highest political cost to establish, as it would require sustained member-state buy-in and a dedicated budget line comparable to an existing specialised agency.

### **Rotational Council**

Membership rotates among regional blocs on a fixed cycle, similar in spirit to non-permanent Security Council seats. Offers broader legitimacy and regional representation, at the cost of institutional continuity and slower accumulation of technical expertise.

### **Emergency Secretariat**

A coordination office reporting to the Secretary-General, with a light standing structure and the authority to convene relevant agencies, the Security Council, and ECOSOC on demand during a declared emergency. This model minimises new bureaucracy and cost, but depends heavily on the convening authority and political weight given to the Secretariat post, and may struggle to compel action from agencies that retain full operational independence.

### **Hybrid Model**

A small permanent core secretariat (early-warning monitoring, financing mechanism administration) paired with a rotational advisory council of member states convened during active emergencies — combining institutional memory with broad-based legitimacy, at the cost of a more complex governance design that delegates would need to specify precisely.

#### **Delegate Task**

*Your committee's final output should either specify one of these models (or a reasoned variant) in operational detail — membership, financing, relationship to the Security Council and ECOSOC, and trigger conditions for activation — or produce a resolution against creating UNERC, grounded in the institutional-design tradeoffs above.*

## SECTION 10 | Expected Committee Output

The committee will produce either: (a) a draft charter/resolution establishing UNERC, specifying mandate, membership, financing, and its relationship to the Security Council, ECOSOC, and the operational agencies; or (b) a reasoned resolution against its creation, proposing instead specific reforms to the existing architecture (OCHA, IASC, cluster system) that address the institutional challenges identified in Section 7.

### Discussion Questions

- Does the recurrence of P5-vetoed crises justify a coordinating body outside the Security Council's authority, or does this simply relocate the same political blockage?
- Should UNERC (if created) have any binding authority, or should it remain purely coordinating — and what would each choice cost in practice?
- How should a standing emergency fund be financed without cannibalising existing agency budgets?
- Which of the nine emergency categories in Section 3 is least well served by the current architecture, and why?

### Research Questions

- What specific reforms did the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit's Grand Bargain propose, and which have been implemented?
- How did the Cluster System (2005) change response coordination compared to the pre-2005 architecture?
- What lessons does the ACT-Accelerator/COVAX structure — built outside the traditional humanitarian system — offer for institutional design?
- How have past proposals for Security Council veto restraint in mass-atrocity situations (e.g., the ACT Code of Conduct) fared politically?

#### Final Note

*This guide is a starting point, not a substitute for original research. Delegates are strongly encouraged to consult primary UN documentation before committee convenes, and to bring updated case material where more recent emergencies have occurred.*

## SECTION 11 | Verified Research Links

The following are official UN and multilateral sources delegates should consult directly. Click any link to open it in your browser; the full URL is also printed for reference.

### Core UN Bodies

- [United Nations — official website](https://www.un.org/en/) — https://www.un.org/en/
- [UN Security Council](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/) — https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
- [UN General Assembly](https://www.un.org/en/ga/) — https://www.un.org/en/ga/
- [ECOSOC — Economic and Social Council](https://www.un.org/ecosoc/) — https://www.un.org/ecosoc/
- [UN Digital Library — Resolutions and Documents](https://digitallibrary.un.org/) — https://digitallibrary.un.org/

### Humanitarian and Emergency Coordination

- [OCHA — UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs](https://www.unocha.org/) — https://www.unocha.org/
- [Inter-Agency Standing Committee \(IASC\)](https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/) — https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/
- [ReliefWeb — humanitarian information service](https://reliefweb.int/) — https://reliefweb.int/
- [Financial Tracking Service \(FTS\) — humanitarian funding data](https://fts.unocha.org/) — https://fts.unocha.org/

### Specialised Agencies

- [World Health Organization \(WHO\)](https://www.who.int/) — https://www.who.int/
- [UNICEF — United Nations Children's Fund](https://www.unicef.org/) — https://www.unicef.org/
- [UNDP — United Nations Development Programme](https://www.undp.org/) — https://www.undp.org/
- [UNHCR — UN Refugee Agency](https://www.unhcr.org/) — https://www.unhcr.org/
- [UNEP — UN Environment Programme](https://www.unep.org/) — https://www.unep.org/
- [FAO — Food and Agriculture Organization](https://www.fao.org/) — https://www.fao.org/
- [WFP — World Food Programme](https://www.wfp.org/) — https://www.wfp.org/
- [WTO — World Trade Organization](https://www.wto.org/) — https://www.wto.org/
- [IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency](https://www.iaea.org/) — https://www.iaea.org/
- [IOM — International Organization for Migration](https://www.iom.int/) — https://www.iom.int/

### Reference and Case-Study Sources

- [IPC — Integrated Food Security Phase Classification](https://www.ipcinfo.org/) — https://www.ipcinfo.org/
- [World Bank — Data and Country Overviews](https://www.worldbank.org/) — https://www.worldbank.org/
- [IMF — Publications and Country Reports](https://www.imf.org/) — https://www.imf.org/
- [International Committee of the Red Cross \(ICRC\)](https://www.icrc.org/en) — https://www.icrc.org/en